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Article 
“Macro-Transparency” as Structural 
Directive: A Look at the NSA Surveillance 
Controversy 
Heidi Kitrosser† 
In December 2005, the New York Times broke a shocking 
story. For roughly four years, the National Security Agency 
(NSA) had run a secret surveillance program in which it spied 
without warrants on thousands of calls made between the 
United States and foreign nations.1 It soon was revealed that 
the Bush administration had authorized the program through 
secret executive order in 2002.2 Critics charged that the ad-
ministration was violating the law by circumventing the re-
quirements outlined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA).3 The administration defended the program’s legal-
ity4 and expressed fury at the public disclosure of the program’s 
 
 † Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I 
thank Mike Paulsen for his insightful suggestions. I also thank the students of 
the Minnesota Law Review for organizing a terrific symposium and for their 
work in editing this piece. Copyright © 2007 by Heidi Kitrosser. 
 1. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without 
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1; see also JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR 
43−44 (2006); Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Eavesdropping Effort Began 
Soon After Sept. 11 Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2005, at A44; David E. 
Sanger, In Address, Bush Says He Ordered Domestic Spying, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
18, 2005, at A1. 
 2. See RISEN, supra note 1, at 44; Memorandum from Elizabeth B. Bazan 
& Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative Attorneys, Congressional Research Service 2 
(Jan. 5, 2006), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/m010506.pdf (addressing presi-
dential authority to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance to gather for-
eign intelligence information). 
 3. See, e.g., RISEN, supra note 1, at 44−59; Bazan & Elsea, supra note 2, 
at 42−44; Tom Daschle, Op-Ed., Power We Didn’t Grant, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 
2005, at A21; George F. Will, Editorial, No Checks, Many Imbalances, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 16, 2006, at A27. 
 4. See Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney Gen., to Wil-
liam H. Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate (Jan. 19, 2006), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf [hereinafter 
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existence.5 A common point in the administration’s defensive 
and offensive positions is that the program’s very existence 
needed to be kept secret.6 The administration’s offensive posi-
tion is that the program’s existence should never have been 
leaked and that any leakers may be prosecuted.7 The admini-
stration’s defensive position is that the program and its secrecy 
were national security necessities and that existing statutes, 
not to mention Article II of the Constitution, should be read as 
authorizing the program and its secrecy.8 
This umpteenth call for national security secrecy by the 
Bush administration9 gets the Constitution’s approach to in-
formation control dangerously wrong. This Article focuses on 
this mistake’s manifestation in the administration’s defense of 
the program and its secrecy.10 The administration’s defense 
suggests a false choice between complete secrecy and complete 
openness. It also suggests a parallel false choice between near-
complete presidential discretion and an ineffective national se-
curity system. Additionally, the administration’s defense 
wrongly assumes that the Constitution poses these choices. 
These errors stem from two fundamental problems in the 
administration’s reading of the Constitution. First, the admini-
stration dramatically overreads the President’s discretion to 
act, in the name of national security, in contravention of spe-
cific statutory mandates. It overlooks, in short, the Constitu-
tion’s careful balance of powers between the legislative and ex-
 
DOJ WHITE PAPER]. 
 5. See Bruce Ackerman, The Secrets They Keep, SLATE, Dec. 20, 2005, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2132811; Editorial, On the Subject of Leaks, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 4, 2006, at A14; Sanger, supra note 1. 
 6. See, e.g., DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 40−41. 
 7. See Ackerman, supra note 5; Editorial, supra note 5; Sanger, supra 
note 1; see also Bob Herbert, Do You Know What They Know?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 6, 2006, at A23; Gabriel Schoenfeld, Has the “New York Times” Violated 
the Espionage Act?, COMMENTARY, Mar. 2006, http://www.commentarymagazine 
.com/cm/main/viewArticle.aip?article=com.commentarymagazine.content.Article:: 
10136; Scott Shane, Leak of Classified Information Prompts Inquiry, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 29, 2006, at A10; Scott Sherman, Chilling the Press, THE NATION, 
July 17, 2006, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060717/sherman. 
 8. See sources cited supra note 7. 
 9. For a general discussion of rampant secrecy in the Bush administra-
tion, see Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege 
Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 489 (2007). 
 10. While this mistake also manifests itself in the administration’s call for 
leak prosecutions, that topic is beyond this Article’s scope. For such a discus-
sion, see Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech (2007) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=958099. 
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ecutive branches. Second, the administration misconstrues the 
relationship between this balance and information control. An 
important reason for this balance’s very existence, as evidenced 
by constitutional history, text, and structure, is to reconcile the 
democratic virtues of government transparency with the occa-
sional need for government secrecy. The Constitution reconciles 
these factors by effectively mandating what this Article calls 
“macro-transparency” in governing, while leaving room for “mi-
cro-secrecy.” The macro-transparency directive is that law exe-
cution must be traceable to publicly created and publicly known 
laws, even if those laws allow their execution to occur in secret 
(that is, even if they allow micro-secrecy). This point raises 
many questions of application, including how narrow legisla-
tion must be to be sufficiently transparent, whether legislative 
oversight of law execution may itself occur in secret and 
whether there are emergency exceptions to the general rule of 
micro-secrecy. For introductory purposes, though, what is im-
portant is to understand the general directive of macro-
transparency and its accompanying allowance of micro-secrecy. 
The administration’s first error—its overreading of presi-
dential discretion to ignore specific statutory mandates—has 
been noted by many critics of the NSA program.11 While the 
program’s secrecy also has been criticized,12 the connection be-
tween that secrecy and the administration’s first, more basic 
error, has not been considered in much depth.13 Thus, the ten-
sion between the relatively transparent legislative process and 
the need for secrecy has not been meaningfully explored. Nor 
has the constitutional balance between macro and micro-
secrecy and its ability to resolve this tension been identified. 
These points are very important. Without them, the arguments 
that the Constitution provides for some presidential secrecy 
and that near-complete secrecy was called for in this case are 
not fully answered. Furthermore, it is important more gener-
 
 11. See RISEN, supra note 1, at 44−59; Bazan & Elsea, supra note 2, at 
42−44; Daschle, supra note 3; Will, supra note 3; see also John Cary Sims, 
What the NSA is Doing . . . and Why It’s Illegal, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 105, 
105−40 (2006); Memorandum from David Kris, Assoc. Attorney Gen., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 25, 2006), http://balkan.blogspot.com/kris.fisa.pdf. 
 12. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 5; Daniel J. Solove, How Much Gov-
ernment Secrecy Is Really Necessary?, Dec. 17, 2005, http:// 
concurringopinions.com/achives/2005/12. 
 13. See Heidi Kitrosser, Presidential Secrecy and the NSA Spying Contro-
versy, JURIST, Feb. 27, 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/02/ 
presidential-secrecy-and-nsa-spying.php. 
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ally to understand the Constitution’s macro-transparency di-
rective and its connection to the legislature/executive relation-
ship. As I have explained elsewhere, the failure to perceive this 
directive lends itself to a troubling over-reliance on executive 
branch discretion to operate in secret.14 Without an under-
standing of this directive, such discretion is seen as the only al-
ternative to unchecked openness. The practical results of such 
misunderstanding range from the dramatic overclassification of 
information with few checks on the same, to the invocation of 
executive privilege as a talisman to keep information from 
Congress and the public.15 
This Article explores the Constitution’s macro-
transparency directive and its connection to the legisla-
ture/executive relationship, using two NSA surveillance contro-
versies, one past and one present, as analytical foci. Part I ex-
plains the textual, structural and historical basis for the 
Constitution’s macro-transparency directive. Part II discusses 
the NSA surveillance controversies of the 1970s and congres-
sional reaction thereto, including the creation of FISA and ac-
companying oversight provisions. Part II explains that these 
episodes shed much light on the wisdom of the macro-
transparency directive and on the importance of vigilance by 
Congress and the public to ensure the directive’s preservation. 
Part III discusses the current NSA controversy and the admini-
stration’s defense of its post-9/11 NSA program. Part III cites 
the many constitutional errors in the administration’s defense 
of the program and their common bases in the misuse of the 
concept of national security secrecy and in the overlooking of 
the macro-transparency directive. This Article concludes by 
discussing congressional reactions since the press revealed the 
post-9/11 program’s existence, and what these reactions tell us 
about the value—and the limitations—of the macro-
transparency directive. 
 
 14. See Kitrosser, supra note 9, at 510−36. 
 15. See id. 
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I.  THE CONSTITUTION’S MACRO-TRANSPARENCY 
DIRECTIVE   
A. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE 
POWERS 
This Subpart outlines the respective macro-policy and mi-
cro-implementation/execution roles of the legislature and ex-
ecutive. It does so for two reasons. First, although aspects of 
the relationship are obvious, we live in an era that has bred 
vast claims for unchecked presidential power.16 As such, it is 
important to detail the legislature’s function relative to that of 
the executive. It is particularly important to explain why na-
tional security-related governance exists, like other matters, 
within this general framework. Second, the macro-/micro-
framework is a useful way to conceptualize the legisla-
ture/executive relationship. For one thing, the framework helps 
us to identify the common qualities of the legislature/executive 
relationship in military and non-military contexts. Most impor-
tant for our purposes, understanding the macro-/micro-
framework lends itself to an understanding of the parallel 
framework with respect to government information control. 
It is useful to begin with an understanding of the general 
purpose that underscores the relationship between macro-
policymaking legislature and micro-implementing executive. As 
a matter of logical inference from text and structure, the pur-
pose appears to be to balance the liberty-enhancing features of 
the legislature with the energy and efficacy-enhancing features 
of the executive. The legislature’s features, including its nu-
merical breadth and its formal, dialogic, dual-chamber and 
dual-branch processes17 seem directed at enhancing liberty by 
restraining hasty, ill-considered, secretive government action.18 
The executive’s features, including a single President and his 
broad directives to execute the law and to command military 
forces,19 seem designed to ensure an executive who can safely 
and urgently carry out the policies of the legislature.20 These 
 
 16. See, e.g., Jane Mayer, The Hidden Power, NEW YORKER, July 3, 2006, 
at 44−55; Jeffrey Rosen, The Power of One, NEW REPUBLIC, July 24, 2006, at 
8−10. 
 17. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 18. See Adrian Vermuele, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Proce-
dure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 387 (2005). 
 19. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. §§ 2−3. 
 20. See Gerhard Caspers, The American Constitutional Traditions of 
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combined features thus seem designed to ensure the country’s 
capacity to protect itself and otherwise to act quickly and effi-
ciently when necessary, and to guarantee deliberation and 
transparency in crafting the larger framework within which 
such actions occur. 
These logical inferences are bolstered by history. James 
Madison, writing as Publius, identified a key challenge of the 
Constitution’s drafting to be “combining the requisite stability 
and energy in government with the inviolable attention due to 
liberty and to the republican form.”21 Alexander Hamilton took 
up this challenge in assessing the executive branch in particu-
lar. He rhetorically asked Federalist Paper readers whether the 
executive branch balances “all the requisites to energy” against 
“the requisites to safety, in the republican sense—a due de-
pendence on the people, a due responsibility.”22 He concluded 
that this balance is achieved largely through legislative check-
ing.23 
1. Legislation, Excluding Military Activities 
The Constitution plainly establishes a framework wherein 
the legislature sets the nation’s policy on a macro level.24 Exe-
cution, and thus the relative micro-detail work of implementing 
the legislative big picture, falls to the executive branch.25 Arti-
cle I, Section 8 lays out the legislature’s policymaking domain.26 
Among the legislature’s most important powers are its abilities 
to raise funds through taxation and borrowing, to coin money 
and set its value and to “provide for the . . . general Welfare” 
through spending.27 Article I, Section 9 makes clear that “[n]o 
Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence 
of Appropriations made by Law.”28 These provisions mark an 
attempt to ensure that the executive, while spending and en-
forcing revenue-raising measures with energy and efficiency, 
 
Shared and Separated Powers: An Essay in Separation of Powers, 30 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 211, 234−41 (1989). 
 21. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 194 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961). 
 22. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 21, at 
431−32. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 25. See id. art. II, § 2. 
 26. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1−18. 
 27. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 28. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
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does so within a policy framework created through the protec-
tive, dialogic and transparent realm of legislative process.29 
The concern to balance liberty against energy and efficiency is 
reflected more broadly throughout the complementary legisla-
tive and executive powers accorded respectively by Articles I 
and II. This includes, of course, Congress’s ability to regulate 
matters including foreign and interstate commerce,30 and its 
ability to legislate on that which is “necessary and proper” to 
effectuating its enumerated powers and those of the executive 
and judicial branches.31 The resulting legislation constitutes 
the statutory law that the executive is to execute.32 
One complication that demonstrates the general nature of 
the legislature/executive relationship and its intended protec-
tiveness is the problem of delegation. Delegation, or the non-
delegation doctrine, raises the question of just how broad 
“macro-policy” can be before it ceases to give the executive the 
mere power to execute its terms and instead delegates legisla-
tive power.33 Today, the non-delegation doctrine lacks much 
doctrinal bite, although it has influence as a “shadow” doc-
trine.34 The very need for such a doctrine demonstrates the 
practical complications in demanding that the executive refrain 
from legislating.35 Nonetheless, the doctrine’s existence and its 
acknowledged purpose reflect the intended nature of the legis-
lature/executive relationship and the goals underlying such in-
tent. Furthermore, the ability of the legislature to craft both 
very broad and very narrow legislation is a virtue in a substan-
tial sense. Such ability reflects the tremendous flexibility of the 
macro-policymaking, or legislative, process. The legislature can 
accord the President tremendous discretion where that appears 
necessary, including the discretion to carry out legislative di-
rectives in secret.36 But among the legislature’s tools to check 
 
 29. See, e.g., 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION  
§ 1342 (Cambridge, Brown, Shattuck, and Co. 1833). 
 30. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 31. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 32. See id. art. II, § 3. 
 33. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371−72 (1989); Field v. 
Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693−94 (1892). 
 34. See Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some 
Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 427, 442−43 (1989). 
 35. See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372 (“Congress simply cannot do its job 
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”). 
 36. See, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 9, at 528−30 (discussing the legisla-
ture’s ability to prescribe the boundaries of presidential secrecy). 
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the abuses of such discretion is the ability to pass narrower 
statutory directives, whether in anticipation of or in response to 
such abuse. Indeed, the practical reality that it is hard to police 
non-delegation requirements and that broad legislative direc-
tives to the executive are common makes it all the more urgent 
to restrain blatant executive disregard for those clear legisla-
tive limitations that do exist. 
2. Military Activities 
Two contrasting theories make the military context a par-
ticularly important one in which to examine the constitutional 
dynamic between legislature and executive. This Article ar-
gues, on the one hand, that while the need and apparent intent 
to provide for robust presidential micro-powers is particularly 
acute in the military realm, so is the need and apparent intent 
to provide robust legislative macro-constraints. On the other 
hand, theories of unchecked presidential prerogative in war-
time have been deeply influential within the Bush administra-
tion,37 and have gained some ground within the academy as 
well.38 Given this background, it is particularly important to 
outline the ways in which the Constitution demands checks 
and balances in the realm of military affairs. It is worth reiter-
ating the organizing principle of these checks and balances: 
while the President seems indeed to have heightened micro-
powers in this realm, so does the legislature have enhanced 
macro-powers. Combined, these features translate the comple-
mentary benefits of energy and liberty to the realm of military 
action. 
Military checks and balances are apparent in the text and 
structure of Articles I and II of the Constitution. Textually, the 
President’s heightened micro-powers are embodied by his twin 
directives to execute the law, including military related legisla-
tion, and to serve as commander in chief of the armed forces.39 
Structurally, the qualities of the presidential office equip the 
 
 37. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., WAR AND THE AMERICAN PRESI-
DENCY 59−67 (2004); Linda Greenhouse, Detention Cases Before Supreme 
Court Will Test Limits of Presidential Power, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004, at 
A20; Mayer, supra note 16, at 44−55; Rosen, supra note 16, at 8−10. 
 38. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles and National 
Security: Hamdan and Beyond 3 (Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper 
No. 134, 2006), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=922406 (citing such 
theories within academia). 
 39. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; id. § 3. 
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President to quickly execute defensive and offensive actions.40 
This fact, combined with the textual provisions cited above and 
the more general provision vesting “the executive Power”41 in 
the President, suggest robust presidential duties and preroga-
tives in the realm of military activity. Yet the analysis cannot 
stop there. Article I makes clear that the President is not un-
checked within this realm.42 While his powers may be more ro-
bust within this realm, so too are the powers accorded the legis-
lature to create and control the macro-framework within which 
the President operates. Among Congress’s military powers are 
its powers to declare war,43 to “make Rules concerning Cap-
tures on Land and Water,”44 “to raise and support Armies,”45 
“to provide and maintain a Navy,”46 “to make Rules for the 
Government and Regulation of land and naval Forces,”47 “to 
provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the 
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions,”48 and to 
“provide for organizing, arming and disciplining, the Militia, 
and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the 
Service of the United States.”49 
Indeed, the Supreme Court recently relied on Congress’s 
copious checking functions over presidential wartime power in 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, where a majority of the Court concluded 
that the President lacked the power to employ executive-
created military commissions.50 The conclusion was based 
partly on the view that Congress had directed the use of other 
adjudicative forums under circumstances like those at issue.51 
A concurrence by Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Kennedy, 
Souter and Ginsburg, summed up that conclusion’s grounding 
in constitutional checks and balances: “The Court’s conclusion 
ultimately rests upon a single ground: Congress has not issued 
the Executive a ‘blank check’ . . . Where, as here, no emergency 
prevents consultation with Congress, judicial insistence upon 
 
 40. See supra notes 19−20 and accompanying text. 
 41. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 42. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15−16. 
 43. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
 46. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13. 
 47. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
 48. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. 
 49. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
 50. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2756−57 (2006). 
 51. See id. at 2759, 2772−75, 2786−96. 
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that consultation does not weaken our Nation’s ability to deal 
with danger.”52 
Justice Breyer’s suggestion that only an emergency might 
justify the circumvention of a statutory mandate is echoed by 
the majority at points.53 This proposition reflects yet another 
more complicated aspect of the macro-/micro-relationship be-
tween legislature and executive. Because only the executive is 
structurally equipped to respond to immediate, unanticipated 
threats,54 it stands to reason that the executive and com-
mander-in-chief roles include the power to respond to such 
threats absent, or in rare cases contrary to, statutory authority. 
Such rare circumstances are those in which the legislative 
process cannot be activated in time to respond to a major, im-
minent threat and in which the executive’s vigor and dispatch 
therefore must fill the power void.55 The key here, however, is 
to understand how crucial it is that such responses be rare and 
temporally limited to what the immediate emergency re-
quires.56 Once the immediate emergency passes, the transpar-
ency, dialogue and other protections of the legislative process 
must be invoked to legitimize any continuing activities that fall 
outside existing statutory mandates.57 This enables the execu-
tive to properly maintain its micro-execution role. It may step 
in to fill temporary power voids necessary to preserve the 
status quo when emergencies present themselves. However, 
should it go beyond these restrictions to secretly run programs 
that fall outside of these situational and temporal limitations 
 
 52. Id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 53. See id. at 2773−74; cf. id. at 2790 (“[A]ny departure must be tailored 
to the exigency that necessitates it.”). 
 54. See U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1−3; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alex-
ander Hamilton), supra note 21, at 424 (referring to single-headed presidency’s 
unique capacity for “[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch”). 
 55. Cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 552 (2004) (Souter, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part) (“[I]n a moment of genuine emergency, when 
the Government must act with no time for deliberation, the Executive may be 
able to detain a citizen if there is reason to fear he is an imminent threat to 
the safety of the Nation and its people . . . .”). 
 56. Cf. id. (“[A]n emergency power of necessity must at least be limited by 
the emergency.”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 
646−47 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (describing the danger and historical 
abuse of the concept of emergency powers). 
 57. Cf. Laura S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced Power: The Kinetic Constitution, 46 
DUKE L.J. 679, 774−77 (1997) (making the interesting argument that the 
Youngstown Court should have positively valued the fact that the President, 
shortly after ordering seizure of the steel mills, invited Congress’s public ap-
proval or disapproval of his action). 
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and outside existing statutory authorizations, it crosses a line 
to usurp legislative powers. More importantly, it threatens the 
liberty that such a line is meant to protect. 
This reading of the situationally and temporally limited 
realm in which executive power may transcend statutory limi-
tations parallels the historical understanding that the Presi-
dent, while dependent on Congress to declare war, nonetheless 
has the power to repel sudden attacks.58 Indeed, the Constitu-
tion’s drafters altered Congress’s Article I war power from the 
power to “make war” to “the power to declare war” after it was 
urged that the President have the power to repel sudden at-
tacks.59 At the same time, it was argued in both the drafting 
and ratification processes that, beyond such temporally limited 
emergencies, the President must and would remain subject to 
any congressional restraints.60 
Finally, while it has been argued that the President uni-
laterally may engage in hostilities greater than the repelling of 
sudden attacks,61 even such arguments accept a framework of 
legislative control over any presidentially initiated actions, in-
cluding Congress’s ability to stop such hostilities entirely by 
withholding funding.62 Taken on their own terms, then, such 
arguments assume public and congressional knowledge and ul-
timate control of hostilities. Thus, even from the vantage point 
of such arguments, the President fills a micro-role in plugging 
temporarily and situationally limited gaps that are checkable 
by Congress when time and circumstances make such checking 
feasible. 
B. THE LEGISLATURE, THE PRESIDENT, AND THEIR RESPECTIVE 
RELATIONSHIPS TO INFORMATION CONTROL 
The general relationship between the macro-policymaking 
legislature and the micro-implementing executive, then, re-
flects a desire to balance needs for liberty and wisdom against 
needs for energy and efficiency. An important subset of this re-
lationship is the relationship between legislature and executive 
with respect to information control. The legislative process is 
designed largely as a transparent one to protect the people 
 
 58. See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 8 (2d ed., rev. 2004); 
JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE 96−100 (2005). 
 59. See FISHER, supra note 58, at 8; YOO, supra note 58, at 96−100. 
 60. See FISHER, supra note 58, at 8−10. 
 61. See YOO, supra note 58, at 96−100, 104−05. 
 62. See id. at 22, 139−42. 
KITROSSER_4FMT 6/1/2007 11:16:58 AM 
1174  MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:1163 
 
against the tyrannical potential of secret government.63 The 
presidential office, on the other hand, is designed in significant 
part to facilitate presidential secrecy.64 The Constitution thus 
embodies a “macro-transparency” directive insofar as it gener-
ally requires transparency in the macro-policymaking, or legis-
lative process. Accompanying this directive is an allowance of 
“micro-secrecy,” permitting presidential implementation some-
times to occur in secret. The justifications for this relationship 
also are a subset of the justifications for the general macro-
/micro-relationship between legislature and executive. The se-
cret implementation of macro-policy directives by the executive 
can have obvious benefits for national security and for energy 
and efficiency more generally. Yet the openness of the process 
through which the governing macro-directives are formulated 
guards against the threats to liberty and wisdom that secrecy 
breeds. 
This conclusion follows logically when one juxtaposes the 
relatively transparent nature of the legislative process and the 
President’s structural capacity for secrecy against the macro-
/micro-relationship between legislature and executive gener-
ally. As for the generally transparent nature of the legislative 
process, I have catalogued elsewhere the various elements of 
inter-branch and intra-branch dialogue and transparency of the 
process, citing “a general expectation of deliberation and rela-
tive openness in the proceedings of the House and the Sen-
ate.”65 This expectation is exemplified partly by the require-
ment in Article I, Section 5, Clause 3 that “[e]ach House shall 
keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time pub-
lish the same.”66 Although the clause allows Congress to ex-
empt “such [p]arts as may in their Judgment require Se-
crecy,”67 this allowance notably is framed as an exception to a 
general openness norm. This fact, combined with the many-
membered and dialogic nature of the legislature indicates an 
expectation that instances of legislative secrecy will be rare and 
will be sufficiently well known as to generate internal and ex-
ternal pressures in response to them.68 The general expectation 
of congressional openness is bolstered also by historical expec-
 
 63. See infra notes 65−71 and accompanying text. 
 64. See infra text accompanying note 72. 
 65. Kitrosser, supra note 9, at 518. 
 66. Id. at 521 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3). 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. at 522−24. 
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tations that congressional proceedings would be open and that 
the secrecy allowance would be applied very narrowly.69 The 
constitutional protection of legislators against punishment for 
“Speech or Debate” also highlights the intrinsically dialogic leg-
islative process that occurs within this presumptively public 
setting and the importance placed on such dialogue.70 And Arti-
cle I, Section 7 outlines the open, dialogic process of legislating: 
the Constitution requires that a majority of the House of Representa-
tives and of the Senate approve a bill. . . . Furthermore, once each 
chamber approves a bill, the bill must be shared with the President 
who concurs and signs the legislation or who, if he disagrees, not only 
must return the legislation to the chamber in which it originated but 
must do so “with his Objections.” The relationship of this requirement 
to the process’ public nature is particularly clear in light of the man-
date that the relevant chamber “enter the Objections at large on their 
Journal.” Furthermore, the President’s objections ultimately must be 
shared with both congressional chambers and the bill becomes law 
only if two-thirds of each chamber, again against a presumptive 
backdrop of dialogue and relative openness, approves it. In a final nod 
to the process’ public nature, “the Votes of both Houses shall be de-
termined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for 
and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House re-
spectively.”71 
In contrast to the presumptively transparent legislative 
process, the presidency is designed in significant part to facili-
tate secret activity. As a structural matter, this is apparent 
from the fact that the President consists of a single person, who 
naturally is better equipped to keep a secret than a large group 
of people. This also is apparent structurally from the relative 
dearth of formal constitutional requirements as to how the 
President is to go about executing the law or serving as com-
mander in chief. And history supports the notion that a major 
advantage of the single-headed presidency was understood to 
be the President’s ability to operate in secret.72 
It follows logically that a major advantage sought by the 
macro-/micro-relationship between legislature and executive is 
a balanced approach to information control. The executive ex-
ists as a weapon that can be unleashed to engage in secret ac-
 
 69. See id. at 520−27. 
 70. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1; ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE 
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 35–37 (1948) (discussing the 
significance of the Speech and Debate Clause). 
 71. Kitrosser, supra note 9, at 518−19 (citations omitted). For more dis-
cussion of the open and dialogic nature of the legislative process, see 
Fitzgerald, supra note 57, at 761−67. 
 72. See Kitrosser, supra note 9, at 524−26. 
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tivity. Yet the macro-transparency of the legislative process 
that fuels and checks the President’s micro-activities helps pre-
vent presidential secrecy from turning against the people. 
History supports this reading of Articles I and II. Indeed, 
in looking to founding era statements, it is striking to see how 
arguments about the information control advantages of the leg-
islature/executive relationship parallel arguments about the 
general advantages of that relationship. In Federalist 26, for 
example, Alexander Hamilton spoke against objections to the 
government’s power to provide for an army.73 Hamilton ex-
plained that the lodging of this power in the legislative process 
and the limitation on the legislature’s authorizing funds for 
more than two years at a time alleviate most of the cited dan-
gers.74 Hamilton drew partly on the general protections of the 
legislative process, particularly insofar as legislators “are not at 
liberty to vest in the executive department permanent funds for 
the support of an army, if they were even incautious enough to 
be willing to repose in it so improper a confidence.”75 Hamilton 
especially emphasized the protections of the legislature’s dia-
logic, transparent features and of these features coming into 
play every two years with respect to military authorizations.76 
He noted that the legislature must, every two years, “deliber-
ate” about military funds and “declare their sense of the matter 
by a formal vote in the face of their constituents.”77 “As often as 
the question comes forward,” he argued, “the public attention 
will be roused . . . by the party in opposition; and if the majority 
should be really disposed to exceed the proper limits, the com-
munity will be warned of the danger, and will have an opportu-
nity of taking measures to guard against it.”78 
Alexander Hamilton also juxtaposed the advantages of 
presidential secrecy with the checking and sunlight-shedding 
role of the Congress.79 It is important to recognize this feature 
of Hamilton’s ratification era arguments. Hamilton’s extolling 
of a single President’s capacity for secrecy80 often is cited to 
 
 73. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 26 (James Madison), supra note 21, at 171. 
 74. See id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 172. 
 79. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 21, at 
423−25. 
 80. See id. 
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support a broad presidential discretion to keep secrets.81 Yet a 
careful reading of Hamilton’s pre ratification statements re-
veals an emphasis on balancing executive secrecy, vigor and ef-
ficiency against tools for shedding light on and checking execu-
tive abuses.82 For example, in the same Federalist Paper in 
which Hamilton concludes that legislative checking adds 
“safety” to executive “energy,” he discusses the light-generating 
impact of the Senate’s role in the nomination process.83 Echoing 
Madison’s arguments about the transparency of legislative 
military appropriations,84 Hamilton explains: “[A]s there would 
be a necessity for submitting each nomination to the judgment 
of an entire branch of the legislature, the circumstances attend-
ing an appointment . . . would naturally become matters of no-
toriety, and the public would be at no loss to determine what 
part had been performed by the different actors.”85 Both Hamil-
ton and John Jay make similar points about the Senate’s role 
in the treaty process. It is in the context of discussing treaties 
that Jay, like Hamilton, famously touts secrecy as a virtue of 
the single-headed Presidency. Like Hamilton, however, Jay 
combines this point with the benefits of a single President’s ul-
timate transparency for legislative and popular checking 
agents. As I have noted elsewhere: 
After referring approvingly to the President’s capacity for secrecy in 
the treaty negotiation context, Jay dismisses concerns about corrup-
tion, deeming it improbable “that the President and two thirds of the 
Senate will ever be capable of such unworthy conduct.” Jay further 
reassures that “in such a case, if it should ever happen, the treaty so 
obtained from us would, like all other fraudulent contracts, be null 
and void by the law of nations.” Finally, should all other safeguards 
fail, Jay explains that “motive to good behavior is amply afforded by 
the article on the subject of impeachments.” Jay’s references to Sena-
torial, bi-cameral (through impeachment) and international oversight 
assume a capacity on the part of those with oversight power to un-
cover information relating to possible Presidential corruption in the 
treaty-making process. Furthermore, insofar as Jay connects Senato-
rial and Presidential incentives for good behavior with the possibility 
of public rebuke, citing concerns about “honor,” “reputations” and 
“disgrace,” Jay assumes that an investigating and punishing Con-
gress can make damaging information public and that this possibility 
 
 81. See, e.g., MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER, SECRECY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 24−25 (2002). 
 82. See Kitrosser, supra note 9, at 506, 511 (explaining this reading of 
Federalist No. 70). 
 83. See supra notes 22−23 and accompanying text. 
 84. See supra notes 75−78 and accompanying text. 
 85. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 21, at 461. 
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will incentivize good behavior. This is consistent with [an observation 
by Alexander Hamilton] . . . that the Senate will not hesitate to shift 
public blame to the President for problems in the making of treaties.86 
C. THE MACRO-TRANSPARENCY DIRECTIVE AND JUSTICE 
JACKSON’S POWER ZONES 
This Subpart connects the theoretical principles of Sub-
parts A and B to Justice Jackson’s well-known analysis from 
his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.87 
This Subpart does so for two reasons. First, the three power 
zones named by Justice Jackson88 constitute useful shorthand 
to describe the events that will be discussed in Part II. Second, 
the Jackson analysis is one of the most well-known tools for 
conceptualizing the relationship between presidential power 
and congressional power.89 Indeed, this analysis has been cited 
often by participants and commentators in the recent surveil-
lance controversies.90 Yet as with separation of powers analysis 
generally, the relationship between this analysis and informa-
tion control rarely is explored. The relationship of separated 
powers with information control and with the NSA controver-
sies thus may be better understood if the discussion in Sub-
parts A and B is translated into the language of the Jackson 
analysis. 
In Youngstown, Justice Jackson described three basic 
zones of presidential power.91 Presidential power is “at its 
maximum” in zone one.92 In this first zone, “the President acts 
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress.”93 
In zone two, presidential power is at an uncertain, intermedi-
ate level.94 In this second zone, “the President acts in absence 
of either a congressional grant or denial of authority.”95 Here, 
the President: 
 
 86. Kitrosser, supra note 9, at 525−26 (citations omitted). 
 87. 343 U.S. 579, 634−38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 88. Id. at 635−38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (describing three major zones 
in which presidential power can operate). 
 89. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2800 (2006) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring); FISHER, supra note 58, at 116−17. 
 90. See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 11, 19−20, 28; Bazan & Elsea, 
supra note 2, at 5−6. 
 91. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635−38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 92. Id. at 635. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See id. at 637. 
 95. Id. 
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can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of 
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or 
in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional iner-
tia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical 
matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential 
responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to de-
pend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables 
rather than on abstract theories of law.96 
In zone three the President’s “power is at its lowest ebb.”97 
In this third zone, he “takes measures incompatible with the 
express or implied will of Congress.”98 He thus “can rely only 
upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional 
powers of Congress over the matter.”99 
The first zone is the simplest from the perspective of the 
macro-transparency directive. The President’s authority is at 
his highest in this zone because his actions are legitimized by 
statutory authority, which itself is legitimized partly by the 
relative transparency of the legislative process. Hence, even 
where micro-secrecy characterizes aspects of the President’s 
implementation, the macro-framework under which he oper-
ates itself is transparent. The second zone raises the possibility 
of inherent presidential powers or presidential powers pursu-
ant to very broad, ambiguous statutory authority, while the 
third zone raises the possibility of presidential powers that are 
both inherent and that trump contrary statutory authority. Ac-
tions in the respective zones indeed have progressively less 
presumptive legitimacy. The absence of a relatively clear, au-
thorizing statutory process means the absence of legislative 
macro-transparency. And in the third zone, not only is such 
process absent but in its place is a macro-transparent process 
offering false assurance to the public and to other branches 
that the relevant activity will not take place. As suggested in 
Part B, however, there are three major points of flexibility by 
which zone two and even zone three actions sometimes are le-
gitimate. First, inherent powers may be activated in a true 
emergency, although such power must be very carefully con-
strained if it is not to swallow the rules of checks and bal-
ances.100 Indeed, if such power is restrained so that regular po-
litical processes are activated as soon as possible, then the 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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macro-/micro-framework is never truly violated.101 Rather, the 
executive remains in a micro/implementation role insofar as he 
acts unilaterally only to fill a temporary, emergency gap in gov-
ernment infrastructure. Second, the possibility and frequency 
of broad legislation leaves substantial room for executive dis-
cretion and for secrecy in the use of such discretion.102 Techni-
cally, such actions could be said to occur within zone one but 
the line between zones one and two is fine where statutory au-
thority is broad or ambiguous.103 Again, given the dangers 
posed by executive discretion and secrecy, it is crucial that the 
executive branch adhere to any clear legislative limitations and 
to legislative oversight. The legislature’s macro-framework and 
its transparency thus continue to perform at least a shadow 
role, facilitating the exposure of executive branch activity or 
placing other checks on the executive branch. Third, there may 
be other inherent powers that can be invoked without, or in 
rare instances contrary to, statutory authorization, at least 
where a situation that might itself be activated by legislation 
justifies such power.104 For example, where Congress author-
izes the use of military force, presidential powers to execute 
that authorization and to command the military may encom-
pass a range of implementation activities not contemplated by 
the authorization’s language or history. Such a situation is very 
similar to, and may overlap with, the second point of flexibility 
just noted and hence with both zones one and two. And such 
situations could fall within zone three as well. The latter may 
occur, for example, where inherent powers are activated by a 
use of force authorization but where more specific statutes limit 
activities that otherwise would fall within such powers. Zone 
three actions are particularly dangerous because they not only 
lack a macro-transparent authorization but they occur in the 
wake of macro-transparent authorization falsely assuring the 
people and other branches that the relevant actions will not oc-
cur. This is a major reason for the strong presumptive illegiti-
macy of zone three actions. Legislative oversight serves a par-
ticularly important function in these cases, helping to 
 
 101. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 102. For discussion of the non-delegation doctrine, see supra notes 33−35 
and accompanying text.  
 103. See Sunstein, supra note 38, at 4 (discussing the statutory interpreta-
tion problem posed but unanswered by the Jacksonian power zones). 
 104. See supra notes 55−56 and accompanying text. 
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determine whether laws have been violated and if so what con-
sequences should follow. 
II.  NSA SURVEILLANCE BEFORE 9/11 AND THE MACRO-
TRANSPARENCY DIRECTIVE   
Past and present NSA surveillance controversies are 
uniquely apt subjects to view through the lens of the preceding 
analysis. The very topic of surveillance raises the tension be-
tween the need for government secrecy, as surveillance by its 
nature must be conducted covertly, and the dangers of govern-
ment secrecy, as covert surveillance is rife with the potential 
for abuse. The history that led to FISA demonstrates both the 
executive branch’s capacity for secrecy and efficacy and the risk 
that this capacity will be used tyrannically. As Senator Frank 
Church warned at Senate hearings to investigate intelligence 
gathering abuses (“The Church Hearings”), “[t]he danger lies in 
the ability of the NSA to turn its awesome technology against 
domestic communications . . . . [T]he NSA could be turned in-
ward and used against our own people.”105 
This Part discusses some of the history leading to FISA as 
well as aspects of FISA and related legislation. This history and 
resulting legislation have much to tell us about the constitu-
tional principles described in Part I. And new light can be shed 
on the history and legislation themselves by viewing them 
through the lens of these constitutional principles. 
A. FISA AND THE HEARINGS AND EVENTS THAT PRECEDED IT  
In the mid-1970s, a Senate Committee—often called the 
“Church Committee” for its chairman Frank Church—was 
charged to “conduct an investigation and study of governmental 
operations with respect to intelligence activities and of the ex-
tent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities 
were engaged in by any agency of the Federal Government.”106 
This Subpart provides some background on the Committee’s 
findings as to the behavior engaged in by the intelligence agen-
 
 105. 5 Hearings Before S. Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations 
With Respect to Intelligence Activities: National Sec. Agency and Fourth 
Amendment Rights, 94th Cong. 2−3 (1976) [hereinafter Church NSA Hear-
ings]. 
 106. S. Res. 21, 94th Cong. § 1 (1975), quoted in FINAL REPORT OF THE 
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RE-
SPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: BOOK II, at v (1976) [hereinafter CHURCH 
REPORT]. 
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cies generally and the NSA in particular. It also discusses the 
oversight process of the hearings and some of the hearings’ ma-
jor legislative fruits, including FISA. Finally, the Subpart ex-
plores the relationship between these events and the macro-
transparency directive.107 
1. Intelligence Agency Behavior 
The Church Committee’s work focused predominantly on 
five agencies: the FBI, the CIA, the NSA, the national intelli-
gence components of the Defense Department (other than the 
NSA) and the National Security Council and its component 
parts.108 The Committee found that the agencies had engaged 
in decades-long secret monitoring of American citizens.109 Such 
monitoring took various forms, ranging from the opening of 
first class mail, to electronic surveillance and even to infiltra-
tion of groups.110 Agency monitoring was dramatically over-
broad, reaching thousands of American citizens and often trig-
gered by citizens’ associations with civil rights groups, peace 
organizations or other advocacy groups.111 The Committee 
deemed such overbreadth a natural outgrowth of intelligence 
activities’ “tendency . . . to expand beyond their initial scope,”112 
a tendency that “runs through every aspect of [the Commit-
tee’s] investigative findings.”113 The Committee thus identified 
“a consistent pattern in which programs initiated with limited 
goals, such as preventing criminal violence or identifying for-
eign spies, were expanded to what witnesses characterized as 
‘vacuum cleaners,’ sweeping in information about lawful activi-
ties of American citizens.”114 The Committee was careful to em-
phasize that its findings “cannot [be] dismiss[ed] . . . as isolated 
 
 107. A House Committee chaired by Otis Pike and a presidential commis-
sion chaired by Nelson Rockefeller engaged in similar studies around the same 
time. See DENIS MCDONOUGH ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, NO MERE 
OVERSIGHT: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE IS BROKEN 9 (June 
2006) [hereinafter CAP REPORT]. The Church Committee’s reports are widely 
considered the most comprehensive and influential of the studies. For simplic-
ity’s sake, this Article focuses on the Church Committee’s hearings and find-
ings. 
 108. See CHURCH REPORT, supra note 106, at vii. 
 109. See id. at 5−10. 
 110. See id. at 5. 
 111. See id. 
 112. Id. at 4. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 3−4. 
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acts.”115 Rather, the cited behaviors “have occurred repeatedly 
throughout administrations of both political parties going back 
four decades.”116 
The Committee’s findings about the NSA exemplify these 
broader patterns. The NSA was created in 1952 by Executive 
Order “to conduct ‘signals intelligence,’ including the intercep-
tion and analysis of messages transmitted by electronic 
means.”117 The NSA Director testified that the agency’s mission 
“is directed to foreign intelligence obtained from foreign electri-
cal communications”118 and that the NSA interprets “‘foreign 
communications’ to include communication where one terminal 
is outside the United States.”119 Despite the agency’s internal 
limitation against purely domestic surveillance, the Committee 
found that the “distinction between ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ in-
telligence” clearly eroded over time in the NSA’s operations.120 
From 1964 to1976, for example, the NSA “monitored interna-
tional communications of Americans involved in domestic dis-
sent.”121 Like the FBI, the CIA and military intelligence agen-
cies, the NSA was assigned to investigate “‘racial matters,’ the 
‘New Left,’ ‘student agitation,’ and alleged ‘foreign influence’ on 
the antiwar movement.”122 While citing the intelligence com-
munity’s general tendencies toward abuse and overreaching, 
the Church Committee expressed special concerns about these 
tendencies in conjunction with the NSA’s vast technological ca-
pacity.123 
2. Factors Facilitating the Behavior 
How and why could such widespread abuses have occurred 
for so long? The Church Committee’s primary answer was that 
the “checks and balances designed by the Framers of the Con-
stitution to assure accountability have not been applied.”124 
 
 115. Id. at 289. 
 116. Id. at vii, 289. 
 117. Id. at 104. 
 118. Id. (quoting Church NSA Hearings, supra note 105, at 6). 
 119. Id. at vii; see also Church NSA Hearings, supra note 105, at 24−25. 
 120. CHURCH REPORT, supra note 106, at 104. 
 121. Id. at 69. 
 122. Id. at 70; see also id. at 96. 
 123. See supra text accompanying note 105; see also CHURCH REPORT, su-
pra note 106, at 36−38. 
 124. CHURCH REPORT, supra note 106, at 289. 
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Some important elements of this conclusion include the follow-
ing: 
1. Human beings naturally abuse power.125 A major mani-
festation of this fact is the tendency of government officials to 
stretch dramatically the concept of “national security” to justify 
intrusive government operations.126 The Constitution’s Fram-
ers established checks against such natural tendencies, recog-
nizing that we must oblige government not only to “control the 
governed,” but to “control itself.”127 Those checks for years have 
been ignored in the context of intelligence operations.128 
2. The Constitution’s checks and balances were ignored 
most blatantly and systematically in Congress’s failure to pro-
vide a detailed, comprehensive statutory framework governing 
foreign intelligence activity.129 
3. Statutory checks that did exist were bypassed by the in-
telligence agencies.130 
4. The relevant operations were held in vast secrecy within 
the intelligence community.131 In some instances, secrets even 
were kept from higher-ups in the executive branch, and secrecy 
from Congress and from the public was the operative norm.132 
Secrecy amounted not only to omission, but often to downright 
deception.133 The Commission effectively drew a distinction be-
tween macro-secrecy and micro-secrecy, deeming it very trou-
bling that intelligence agencies resorted to the former.134 To 
this effect, the Committee stated, “Abuse thrives on secrecy. 
Obviously, public disclosure of matters such as the names of in-
telligence agents or the technological details of collection meth-
ods is inappropriate. But in the field of intelligence, secrecy has 
 
 125. See, e.g., id. at 291, 293 n.3 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James 
Madison)). 
 126. See id. at 3−4, 104, 205, 289. 
 127. Id. at 293 n.3 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison)); see 
also id. at iii (“[O]ur experience as a nation has taught us that we must place 
our trust in laws, not solely in men.”). 
 128. Id. at iii, 289−90. 
 129. Id. at 165, 169−70; see id. at 186−87, 308; see also Church NSA Hear-
ings, supra note 105, at 35−36, 38, 42, 62−63 (exploring the lack of guidance of 
and restrictions on intelligence-gathering activities). 
 130. CHURCH REPORT, supra note 106, at 139, 190; see also Church NSA 
Hearings, supra note 105, at 57−59 (detailing the legal and constitutional 
problems with the NSA’s SHAMROCK message-collection program). 
 131. CHURCH REPORT, supra note 106, at 146, 292. 
 132. Id. at 146, 152, 292. 
 133. Id. at 16−17, 146. 
 134. See id. at 292. 
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been extended to inhibit review of the basic programs and prac-
tices themselves.”135 
5. Congress failed to provide effective oversight, bolstering 
the intelligence community’s ability to shield other branches 
and the public from knowledge as to the basic nature and exis-
tence of programs.136 
6. The foregoing factors—the absence of much governing 
legislation, violations of existing legislation, secrecy, and lack of 
oversight—stemmed partly from the pervasive view on the part 
of the governing branches and the public “that the control of in-
telligence activities [is] the exclusive prerogative of the Chief 
Executive and his surrogates.”137 
3. Information Disclosure During the Hearings 
A major means through which the legislature can provide 
transparency is through oversight, particularly hearings in 
which executive branch testimony and documents are sought. 
As Woodrow Wilson observed, Congress’s “informing function” 
may be more important than its legislative function.138 The Su-
preme Court, citing Wilson’s point, noted Congress’s power “to 
inquire into and publicize corruption, maladministration or in-
efficiency in agencies of the Government.”139 In this realm, too, 
the choice need not be between complete secrecy and complete 
openness. That is, withholding information from Congress en-
tirely is not the only alternative to full public disclosure. 
Rather, the Constitution again provides for macro-frameworks 
through which Congress can formulate processes to decide 
when and how to request, receive and publicize executive 
branch information. One such macro-framework is the legisla-
tive process.140 Congress can pass and has passed statutes em-
powering it or others to receive information from the executive 
branch.141 These statutes often impose procedural restrictions 
on the means through or extent to which information can be ob-
 
 135. Id. (emphasis added). 
 136. Id. at 6, 14−15; see id. at 290. 
 137. Id. at 292. 
 138. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 n.33 (1957) (quoting 
WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 303 (New York, Houghton 
Mifflin 1885)). 
 139. Id. 
 140. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7. 
 141. See Kitrosser, supra note 9, at 496−500. 
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tained.142 One statute, for example, requires a legislative cham-
ber to vote before a contempt charge can be brought against an 
uncooperative witness.143 A second macro-framework is the 
rulemaking process of each congressional chamber. The Consti-
tution leaves it to “Each House [to] determine the Rules of its 
Proceedings.”144 This encompasses rules on information-
gathering.145 
The Church hearings themselves were, of course, a form of 
oversight. A few aspects of the hearings stand out in this re-
spect. First, the Committee was quite successful in accessing 
national security information of a scope and nature that past 
Congresses had not sought or obtained.146 Indeed, historian 
Loch K. Johnson has labeled the era from 1947, when the Na-
tional Security Act was passed and the intelligence community 
was formally established,147 until 1974 the “Era of Trust.”148 
Johnson relays an anecdote to illustrate the state of oversight 
in the Era of Trust: “then-CIA Director James Schlesinger re-
called . . . Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John 
Stennis (D-Miss.) telling him in 1973, ‘Just go ahead and do it, 
but I don’t want to know!’”149 By the Church Committee’s for-
mation in 1974, Congress was stunned and then emboldened 
after learning, “primarily from press accounts,” “of a series of 
botched and ill-advised covert actions at home and abroad.”150 
This set the stage for the Committee’s substantial mandate151 
and for an atmosphere in which it had the political capital to 
 
 142. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. §§ 192, 194 (2000). 
 143. Kitrosser, supra note 9, at 536 n.218 (citing 2 U.S.C. §§ 192, 194). 
 144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
 145. See, e.g., FREDERICK M. KAISER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PROTECTION 
OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION BY CONGRESS: PRACTICES AND PROPOSALS 1−6 
(2005) (discussing rules created and considered by each house with respect to 
gathering and protecting classified information). 
 146. See, e.g., Church NSA Hearings, supra note 105, at 1−3, 41, 62 (com-
paring the NSA information sought and obtained by the Church Committee to 
that sought and obtained in earlier Congresses); see also CHURCH REPORT, su-
pra note 106, at 6, 152 (noting the past concealment of information from Con-
gress). 
 147. See CAP REPORT, supra note 107, at 6. 
 148. Id. at 9 (citing LOCH K. JOHNSON, GOVERNING IN THE ABSENCE OF 
ANGELS: ON THE PRACTICE OF INTELLIGENCE ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED 
STATES 12 (2003), http://www.dcaf.ch/legal_wg/ev_oslo_030919_ johnson.pdf ). 
 149. Id. at 9 (citing Johnson, supra note 148, at 13). 
 150. Id. 
 151. See supra text accompanying note 106. 
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seek and obtain access to top levels of the intelligence commu-
nity.152 
The Church Committee had important decisions to make 
not only as to the information that it should seek, but as to the 
information that it should make public. In some cases, the 
Committee met privately to determine whether to hold certain 
hearings or discuss certain information in public.153 The Com-
mittee decided, for example, to take the public testimony of 
NSA officials for the first time in history.154 Chairman Church 
noted the following at the start of that hearing: 
  The Committee has elected to hold public hearings on the NSA 
only after the most careful consideration . . . . To make sure this 
committee does not interfere with ongoing intelligence activities, we 
have had to be exceedingly careful, for the techniques of the NSA are 
of the most sensitive and fragile character. We have prepared our-
selves exhaustively; we have circumscribed the area of inquiry to in-
clude only those which represent abuses of power; and we have 
planned the format for today’s hearings with great care, so as not to 
venture beyond our stated objectives. 
   . . . . 
  Our staff has conducted an intensive 5-month investigation of 
NSA, and has been provided access to required Agency files and per-
sonnel. NSA has been cooperative with the committee, and a relation-
ship of mutual trust has been developed. Committee members have 
received several briefings in executive session on the activities of the 
Agency, including a week of testimony from the most knowledgeable 
individuals, in an effort to determine what might be made public 
without damaging its effectiveness. Among others, we have met with 
the Directors of the NSA and the CIA, as well as the Secretary of De-
fense. Finally, once the decision was made to hold public hearings on 
the NSA, the committee worked diligently with the Agency to draw 
legitimate boundaries for the public discussion that would preserve 
 
 152. See supra note 146 (citing references in the Church NSA Hearings and 
in the Church Report regarding relatively meager access by past Congresses to 
information obtained by the Church Committee); see also, e.g., Anthony Lewis, 
Executive Privilege May Be an Issue Again, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1975, at 184 
(“Political will is inevitably related to public opinion, and there the omens 
rather point toward revived Congressional firmness. Vietnam and Watergate 
drastically reduced public belief in the reasons given for executive secrecy.”). 
But see Nicholas M. Horrock, How Deeply Should the C.I.A. Be Looked Into?, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1975, at 182 (“A substantial portion of the public believes 
that too much information on the [CIA] has already come out. These critics say 
that every new publicized detail serves to weaken national security and un-
necessarily expose intelligence operations to foreign governments.”). 
 153. See, e.g., Church NSA Hearings, supra note 105, at 1−3, 5, 46−50, 
51−52, 57−58. 
 154. See id. at 1. 
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the technical secrets of NSA, and also allow a thorough airing of 
Agency practices affecting American citizens. 
  In short, the committee has proceeded cautiously. We are keenly 
aware of the sensitivity of the NSA, and wish to maintain its impor-
tant role in our defense system. Still, we recognize our responsibility 
to the American people to conduct a thorough and objective investiga-
tion of each of the intelligence services. We would be derelict in our 
duties if we were to exempt NSA from public accountability.155 
The existence of intra-Committee debate on the matter of 
publicity was clear. Committee members Senators Tower and 
Goldwater dissented openly to the hearings’ public nature.156 
Senator Hart indicated that he originally had been opposed to 
public hearings but that he had changed his position in light of 
the information gleaned by the Committee about NSA abuses 
and about the hiding of those abuses from Congress and the 
public “for nearly [thirty] years.”157 
4. The Hearings’ Legislative Fruits 
a. FISA 
A major fruit of the hearings was the eventual passage of 
FISA.158 This Subsection notes some major aspects of FISA that 
relate to electronic surveillance.159 
First, FISA’s drafters sought to establish clear, publicly 
known directives for foreign intelligence gathering. Among 
other things, FISA governs electronic surveillance of communi-
cations to or from a U.S. citizen or legal alien who is in the 
United States.160 It also governs electronic surveillance of com-
munications “to or from any person . . . within the United 
States without the consent of at least one party” to the commu-
 
 155. Id. at 1−2. 
 156. See id. at 38, 39, 41, 50, 61, 63. 
 157. Id. at 62. 
 158. See RISEN, supra note 1, at 42; Bazan & Elsea, supra note 2, at 12. 
 159. FISA’s provisions govern “electronic surveillance, physical searches, 
installation and use pen registers/trap and trace devices, and orders to dis-
close tangible items.” 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801−61 (2000); GINA STEVENS & CHARLES 
DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PRIVACY: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL STAT-
UTES GOVERNING WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING, at 37 
(2003). 
 160. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f )(1) (2000) (providing that electronic surveil-
lance includes communications sent or intended to be received by a “known 
United States person who is in the United States”); 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i) (2000) 
(defining “United States person” to include U.S. citizens and legal aliens). 
KITROSSER_4FMT 6/1/2007 11:16:58 AM 
2007] “MACRO-TRANSPARENCY” DIRECTIVE 1189 
 
nication.161 FISA requires, with a few exceptions,162 that such 
surveillance be conducted pursuant to a warrant.163 Warrant 
requests, which must be authorized by the Attorney General, 
are made to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.164 The 
Court is “comprised of eleven federal court judges designated 
by the Chief Justice to sit on the Court for a single seven year 
term.”165 Among other things, the application must specify why 
the person targeted for surveillance “is believed to be a foreign 
power or the agent of a foreign power,”166 a category that in-
cludes those “engaged in international terrorism or activities in 
preparation therefor[e].”167 The application also must summa-
rize the procedures that will be followed to minimize the acqui-
sition and use of information concerning United States citizens 
or legal aliens.168 Additionally, the application must include 
certification by a senior advisor to the President that “a signifi-
cant purpose of interception is to secure foreign intelligence in-
formation”169 and that the information cannot reasonably be 
obtained through other means.170 The application process is 
conducted in a highly secretive manner.171 FISA court judges 
issue ex parte warrants for surveillance “upon a finding that 
the application requirements have been met and that there is 
probable cause to believe that the target is a foreign power or 
the agent of a foreign power.”172 
Second, FISA provides for two emergency exceptions to the 
warrant requirement for electronic surveillance.173 First, the 
 
 161. Bazan & Elsea, supra note 2, at 21 (emphasis added) (citing 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1801(f )(2) (2000) (explaining that electronic surveillance includes communi-
cations sent or received by “a person in the United States, without the consent 
of any party thereto”)). 
 162. See infra notes 173−77 and accompanying text. 
 163. See RISEN, supra note 1, at 42; STEVENS & DOYLE, supra note 159, at 
37. 
 164. STEVENS & DOYLE, supra note 159, at 55. 
 165. Id. (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)−(b), (d) (2000)). 
 166. Id. at 56. 
 167. Id. at 56 n.144 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)−(b) (2000)). 
 168. Id. at 57 & n.145. 
 169. Id. at 58 & n.146 (explaining that the Patriot Act altered the require-
ment from certification that foreign intelligence gathering is “the purpose” of 
interception to certification that foreign intelligence gathering is “a significant 
purpose” of interception). 
 170. Id. at 58. 
 171. Id. at 54. 
 172. Id. at 58 & n.148 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (2000)). 
 173. FISA also provides a third exception that is less relevant for the pur-
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Attorney General is authorized to permit electronic surveil-
lance prior to obtaining a warrant “if the Attorney General de-
termines that emergency conditions make it impossible to ob-
tain [a warrant] with due diligence before the surveillance is 
begun.”174 In such cases, “[t]he Attorney General or his desig-
nee must immediately inform a FISA judge and submit a 
proper application to that judge as soon as practicable, but not 
more than 72 hours” after the surveillance is authorized.175 As 
with FISA surveillance generally, procedures to minimize the 
acquisition and use of information concerning United States 
citizens or legal aliens must be followed.176 A second exception 
permits the Attorney General “to conduct electronic surveil-
lance without a court order for fifteen calendar days following a 
declaration of war by Congress.”177 
Third, it is noteworthy that FISA has been amended explic-
itly on many occasions,178 including through the USA Patriot 
Act of 2001179 and through seven other amending acts passed 
after September 11, 2001.180 Among other things, the Patriot 
Act authorized the use of “[r]oving wiretaps” under FISA,181 in-
creased the permitted duration of FISA wiretaps,182 increased 
the number of FISA court judges from seven to eleven,183 and 
authorized surveillance under FISA where foreign intelligence 
 
poses of this Article. That exception “permits the Attorney General to acquire 
foreign intelligence information for periods of up to one year if the Attorney 
General certifies in writing under oath that the electronic surveillance is 
solely directed at . . . foreign powers or on property or premises under the open 
and exclusive control of a foreign power [not including international terrorist 
organizations] where ‘there is no substantial likelihood that the surveillance 
will acquire’” communications involving U.S. citizens or legal aliens. Bazan & 
Elsea, supra note 2, at 25−26 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1802 (2000)). 
 174. Id. at 26 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f ) (2000)). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000)). 
 178. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLI-
GENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) (2006) [hereinafter FISA AMENDMENTS RE-
PORT] (listing amendments since 1994). 
 179. See id. at 11−18 (listing changes made to FISA by the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act (Patriot Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 
(2001)). 
 180. Id. at 8−29. 
 181. Id. at 11 (citing Patriot Act § 206). 
 182. Id. at 11−12 (citing Patriot Act § 207). 
 183. Id. at 12 (citing Patriot Act § 208). 
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gathering is a “significant purpose,” as opposed to the sole pur-
pose, of surveillance.184 
b. Congressional Oversight Rules 
As reflected in the Church Committee’s conclusions,185 the 
Committee’s hearings and related revelations of the era “con-
vinced many Senators and Representatives that Congress had 
been too lax in carrying out its oversight responsibilities.”186 
With this realization came the end of Congress’s “era of 
trust”187 and the promulgation of some provisions—including 
statutes and internal congressional rules—to facilitate congres-
sional oversight and information.188 Aspects of these provisions 
have been supplemented and amended over the years.189 The 
intelligence community’s current statutory disclosure responsi-
bilities include: 
1. The President is to keep the congressional intelligence 
committees “‘fully and currently informed’ of U.S. intelligence 
activities, including any ‘significant anticipated intelligence ac-
tivity.’”190 
2. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the in-
telligence agency heads similarly must “‘keep the intelligence 
committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence ac-
tivities’. . .” including through written reports on “significant 
anticipated intelligence activity.”191 
3. In carrying out his or her informing duties, the DNI 
must “show ‘due regard for the protection from unauthorized 
disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelli-
 
 184. Id. at 16 (citing Patriot Act § 218); see also supra note 169. 
 185. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 186. CAP REPORT, supra note 107, at 11. 
 187. See supra text accompanying notes 148−49. 
 188. See CAP REPORT, supra note 107, at 11−12; L. BRITT SNIDER, CENT. 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, SHARING SECRETS WITH LAWMAKERS: CONGRESS AS A 
USER OF INTELLIGENCE 6, 8 (1997). 
 189. See ALFRED CUMMING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY PROCE-
DURES UNDER WHICH CONGRESS IS TO BE INFORMED OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE 
ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING COVERT ACTIONS 2−6 (2006); SNIDER, supra note 188, 
at 9−13. 
 190. CUMMING, supra note 189, at 2 (quoting Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 
Pub. L. No. 663, § 15, 60 Stat. 755 (1946) (amended 1956) and S. Rep. No 102-
85, at 32 (1991)). 
 191. Id. at 4 (quoting National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 413(a) 
(1947)). 
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gence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive 
matters.’”192 
4. The President may limit prior notice of actions to the 
congressional group commonly known as the “Gang of Eight”—
meaning “the chairmen and ranking minority members of the 
congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minor-
ity leader of the House of Representatives, and the majority 
and minority leaders of the Senate”193—under very limited cir-
cumstances. Specifically, the President may limit disclosure re-
garding covert actions where the President determines that 
limited notice is “‘essential . . . to meet extraordinary circum-
stances. . .’ affecting U.S. vital interests.”194 “Covert action” is 
distinct from “intelligence activit[y].”195 The former is defined 
by statute to mean “‘an activity or activities of the United 
States Government to influence political, economic, or military 
conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the 
United States Government will not be apparent or acknowl-
edged publicly.’”196 There also is a “possibl[e]” exception for lim-
iting notification to the “Gang of Eight” where “necessary to 
protect intelligence sources and methods.”197 
5. Macro-Transparency Based Reflections 
The history and adoption of FISA and related oversight 
measures do much to vindicate the perceptions and visions of 
the Constitution’s Framers. The years of abuse that prompted 
the Church hearings and FISA demonstrate the intuitive in-
sight that human beings are no “angels,”198 that they have a 
natural tendency to abuse power,199 and that this tendency can 
flourish particularly well in an office equipped for secrecy and 
vigor.200 Happily, however, the corrective potential of separated 
 
 192. Id. 
 193. CAP REPORT, supra note 107, at 22. 
 194. CUMMING, supra note 189, at 5−6. 
 195. Id. at 3. 
 196. Id. at 3 n.8 (quoting the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C.  
§ 413(b) (1947)). 
 197. Id. at 4. 
 198. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 21, at 322. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See, e.g., 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 70 (Max Farrand 
ed., 1911) (citing the statements of James Wilson to suggest that the executive 
should possess secrecy, vigor, and dispatch, and citing James Madison to say 
that he agrees with Wilson but notes the risk of “elective Monarchies”); 2 id. at 
81 (“[The executive] will be more open to caresses [and] intrigues than the 
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powers and their relationship to information control was dem-
onstrated by the eventual exposure of these abuses by the press 
and by Congress’s responses. Among other things, Congress ef-
fectuated further information discovery and crafted legal curbs 
on future abuses. Congress did this in a manner that took ad-
vantage of the virtues of both macro-transparency and micro-
secrecy: macro-transparency through the hearings and through 
subsequent legislation, and micro-secrecy in the executive opac-
ity provided for in FISA and in the oversight mechanisms by 
which the Committee agreed to shield from the public some of 
the information that it learned. The capturing of macro-
transparency’s and micro-secrecy’s advantages is reflected also 
in the fact that decisions to shield information apparently were 
made after discussion and with public acknowledgment of the 
same. 
The following is a more detailed breakdown of the insights 
about macro-transparency and micro-secrecy that can be 
gleaned from the history and adoption of FISA and related 
oversight measures: 
1. The pre-FISA abuses demonstrate the importance of leg-
islative macro-transparency that shapes executive activity. At 
least some of the pre-FISA activity apparently occurred within 
zone two or even zone one of Justice Jackson’s categories, given 
the Church Committee’s observation about the absence of much 
specific constraining legislation.201 This observation most intui-
tively leads, as the Committee concluded, to the view that clear, 
macro-transparent legislative standards should be formulated 
to constrain the executive, even if those standards themselves 
leave room for executive micro-secrecy.202 
2. The pre-FISA abuses also demonstrate the importance of 
congressional oversight of ongoing executive activity. First, 
oversight is necessary to ensure that existing statutory con-
straints are being followed and to facilitate the continued use of 
the macro-transparent legislative process to make further 
statutory changes as needed. Indeed, the Committee discovered 
the violation of some existing statutory constraints, or, in Jus-
tice Jackson’s terms, zone three activity.203 Second, oversight is 
necessary to review zone one and zone two activity. Even if no 
legal violations exist, sufficient policy problems may exist in 
 
Senate.”) (quoting Oliver Elseworth). 
 201. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 202. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 203. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
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the execution of statutory directives to suggest the importance 
of new measures. This may be particularly important with re-
spect to very broad statutory directives. Third, oversight is nec-
essary to discern the existence of possible constitutional viola-
tions, regardless of whether statutory violations exist. The 
Committee repeatedly noted their concern that NSA activity 
ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment.204 The Committee also 
cited the importance of transparency to create awareness of, 
and the potential to redress, such violations.205 
3. FISA exemplifies the ability of legislation to capture the 
advantages of legislative macro-transparency and formality, 
and executive branch micro-secrecy and discretion. For one 
thing, FISA’s core warrant requirement itself combines trans-
parent macro-directives with leeway for the executive to effec-
tuate such directives in relative secrecy.206 FISA also seeks to 
ensure enough regular information flow to Congress to enable 
meaningful oversight without compromising the secrecy of in-
dividual warrant processes. FISA requires, for example, annual 
reporting on the number of applications sought and granted.207 
FISA’s emergency exceptions also seek to capture through stat-
ute the emergency response function of the executive valued in 
constitutional history and structure.208 The limits on these 
emergency exceptions, however, can help to prevent the filling 
of emergency power gaps from morphing into regular, secret 
rule by executive discretion.209 
4. The separate statutory oversight measures enacted in 
the wake of the scandals further exemplify tools to facilitate the 
inter-branch information flow necessary to make the macro-
legislative and micro-execution scheme workable.210 The ongo-
ing informing responsibility imposed by these statutes211 on the 
intelligence community is particularly important in that subset 
of Jacksonian zone one where very broad legislative directives 
exist, and in Jacksonian zone two, where no legislative direc-
 
 204. See CHURCH REPORT, supra note 106, at 14, 137, 139, 190−91, 290−91. 
 205. See supra notes 131−35 and accompanying text; see also Church NSA 
Hearings, supra note 105, at 46−52; CHURCH REPORT, supra note 106, at 2−3. 
 206. See supra notes 163−72 and accompanying text. 
 207. See ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE FOREIGN IN-
TELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT: AN OVERVIEW OF THE STATUTORY FRAME-
WORK AND RECENT JUDICIAL DECISION 32 (2005). 
 208. See supra notes 173−77 and accompanying text. 
 209. See supra notes 173−77 and accompanying text. 
 210. See supra notes 190−97 and accompanying text. 
 211. See supra notes 190−91 and accompanying text. 
KITROSSER_4FMT 6/1/2007 11:16:58 AM 
2007] “MACRO-TRANSPARENCY” DIRECTIVE 1195 
 
tives exist. In such realms, Congress may not know which 
questions to ask or which information to request to conduct ef-
fective oversight unless the executive branch regularly provides 
Congress with basic information. And, the “Gang of Eight” pro-
vision cited earlier212 reflects the fact that Congress, through 
legislation and through its constitutional ability to create intra-
chamber procedural rules, has countless mechanisms available 
to it to strike a balance between complete secrecy and complete 
openness. Limiting the “Gang of Eight” provision to only cer-
tain covert actions213 also indicates Congress’s awareness of the 
potential abuse of exceptions to a general informing responsi-
bility. Finally, as noted earlier, Congress has other, more gen-
eral information-gathering statutes and intra-chamber rules at 
its disposal.214 As the Church hearings reflect, for example, 
Senate committees privately may discuss and vote on whether 
to take testimony behind closed doors or whether to take it pub-
licly, and the public may be made privy at least to the fact and 
topic of this discussion.215 
III.  POST-9/11 DEVELOPMENTS:  
LESSONS UNLEARNED AND POSSIBLY RELEARNED   
A. THE NSA’S POST-9/11 ACTIONS AND THE ADMINISTRATION’S 
RESPONSE TO THE LEAKED INFORMATION 
In December of 2005, the New York Times broke the story 
that the Bush administration, since shortly after 9/11, had se-
cretly authorized the NSA to spy on telephone calls where one 
party to the call was outside of the United States.216 Members 
of the administration, including President Bush and Attorney 
General Gonzales, have publicly confirmed the existence of the 
program.217 Furthermore, the administration has defended the 
 
 212. See supra notes 193−97 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 214. See supra notes 141−45 and accompanying text. 
 215. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 216. See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 1; Sanger, supra note 1. 
 217. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 
754, 764−65 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (“It is undisputed that [the] Defendants have 
publicly admitted . . . [that] the [surveillance program] exists.”); Hepting v. 
AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 993 (N.D. Cal 2006) (discussing government 
admissions and concluding that “the government has disclosed the general 
contours of the ‘terrorist surveillance program’”); see also, e.g., DOJ WHITE PA-
PER, supra note 4, at 1; Sanger, supra note 1; Press Release, Press Briefing by 
Attorney Gen. Alberto Gonzales and Gen. Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy 
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program vigorously through public legal memoranda, in con-
gressional hearings, and in the press.218 Despite its defenses, 
which are discussed below, the administration has never seri-
ously claimed that the program complies with FISA’s warrant 
requirements. Indeed, the administration could not make this 
argument in light of its admission that the program permits 
warrantless telephone surveillance of U.S. citizens and legal 
aliens so long as one party to the call is overseas. Such permis-
sion, of course, runs directly counter to FISA’s terms prohibit-
ing warrantless surveillance of any call to which a U.S. citizen 
or legal alien in the United States is a party. Nor is there any 
claim that the NSA program falls under one of FISA’s emer-
gency exceptions, as the program is not limited either to 
seventy-two-hour intervals of warrantless spying or to a fifteen-
day period following a congressional declaration of war.219 
The administration’s main legal defense comprises two ar-
guments. First, the administration argues that it need not have 
complied with FISA because FISA’s requirements were sup-
planted by the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF) enacted in the wake of the September 11th attacks. 
Second, the administration argues that, even if the AUMF does 
not directly authorize the NSA program, the Constitution in-
herently empowers the President to create such a program. 
And while the administration often avoids saying it defini-
tively, it repeatedly indicates that any legislation that conflicts 
with such inherent power probably is unconstitutional.220 
As for the first argument, the AUMF was enacted three 
days after September 11, 2001. It authorized the President: 
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, or-
ganizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, commit-
ted, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent 
any future acts of international terrorism against the United States 
by such nations, organizations or persons.221 
 
Dir. for Nat. Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Gonzales-Hayden 
Briefing], http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/print/20051219-1.html. 
 218. See, e.g., Wartime Executive Power and National Security Agency’s 
Surveillance Authority: Hearing Before Comm. on Judiciary, 109th Cong. 11 
(2006), available at http://fas.org/irp/congress/2006-hr/nsasurv.pdf [hereinafter 
Gonzales Transcript]; DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 4; Sanger, supra note 1; 
Gonzales-Hayden Briefing, supra note 217. 
 219. See supra notes 176−77 and accompanying text (citing these statutory 
exceptions). 
 220. See discussion infra Part III.B.  
 221. S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. § 2(a) (2001). 
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The administration argues that this authorization encom-
passes the NSA surveillance program as necessary, incident to 
determining who was involved in the attacks and to using force 
against such persons.222 The administration further argues 
that FISA’s language provides for supplementation by other 
statutes by prohibiting “intentionally ‘engag[ing] . . . in elec-
tronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by 
statute.’”223 According to the administration, AUMF constitutes 
an authorizing statute, effectively superseding FISA’s provi-
sions with respect to the post-9/11 NSA activities.224 
Although the AUMF argument is couched as statutory in 
nature, it rests in substantial part on constitutional interpreta-
tion—specifically, on a very broad reading of presidential power 
under Article II. This fact is manifested most obviously in the 
administration’s constitutional avoidance argument, whereby it 
argues that any statutory ambiguity should be resolved in the 
administration’s favor to avoid the risk of “infring[ing] on the 
President’s Commander-in-Chief powers.”225 The administra-
tion deems such powers at their height with respect to “matters 
requiring secrecy—and intelligence in particular.”226 This vi-
sion of Article II also underscores the administration’s reading 
of the AUMF more generally. In explaining its view that “the 
AUMF is a ‘statute’ authorizing surveillance outside the con-
fines of FISA,”227 the administration cites “the Framers’ deci-
sion to vest the President with primary constitutional authority 
to defend the Nation from foreign attack” and attributes the 
decision largely to “the fact that the Executive can act quickly, 
decisively, and flexibly as needed.”228 The administration elabo-
rates that, “[i]n emergency situations, Congress must be able to 
use broad language that effectively sanctions the President’s 
use of the core incidents of military force. That is precisely 
what Congress did when it passed the AUMF on September 14, 
 
 222. See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 10–17; Gonzales Transcript, 
supra note 218, at 13−15. 
 223. DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 20 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 109 (2000)) 
(emphasis added by the DOJ); see also Gonzales Transcript, supra note 218, at 
13. 
 224. See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 23−28; Gonzales Transcript, 
supra note 218, at 47. 
 225. DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 29. 
 226. Id. at 30. 
 227. Id. at 28. 
 228. Id. at 25. 
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2001—just three days after the deadly attacks on America.”229 
Given the respective constitutional roles of the President and 
Congress, then, a broadly worded force authorization passed 
during a national emergency implicitly amends statutes that 
the President deems to constrain his use of the incidents of 
force. 
This theory is most directly invoked in the administration’s 
constitutional argument. The two-part argument is that: (1) the 
NSA program is legitimate even if the AUMF does not author-
ize it because Article II of the Constitution gives the President 
the inherent power to create such programs, particularly in 
times of crisis;230 and (2) If FISA conflicts with such inherent 
powers, then FISA is unconstitutional because it interferes un-
duly with Article II of the Constitution.231 The administration 
has only rarely made the second point definitively.232 Instead, it 
repeatedly has stated that FISA likely would be deemed uncon-
stitutional if the issue were forced.233 Yet despite the admini-
stration’s attempt to obscure its reliance on the second point,234 
it must prevail on this point should its statutory argument fail. 
If the AUMF is not deemed to amend FISA, then FISA consti-
tutes the controlling statutory authority. There is no serious 
dispute that the administration authorized warrantless surveil-
lance of telephone calls governed by FISA’s warrant require-
ments.235 Thus, if forced to rely on its constitutional point, the 
administration must prevail not only on the notion that the 
President’s inherent powers authorize the NSA program, but 
 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 6−10; Gonzales Transcript, supra note 218, at 21−23. 
 231. DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 3. 
 232. Id. (“[I]f this difficult constitutional question had to be addressed, 
FISA would be unconstitutional as applied to this narrow context.”). 
 233. Id. (stating that if the issue of FISA’s constitutionality regarding this 
subject were forced, it “would be called into very serious doubt”); Gonzales 
Transcript, supra note 218, at 61 (responding, when asked about the constitu-
tionality of a surveillance program that violates a statute: “I haven’t done the 
detailed work that obviously these kinds of questions require. These are tough 
questions. But I believe that the President does have the authority under the 
Constitution”); cf. id. at 33 (stating that whether the President may authorize 
warrantless surveillance in the wake of contrary legislation is a “much harder 
question” than that of inherent power absent conflicting legislation); id. at 85 
(“I believe that . . . there would be some serious constitutional questions there. 
But I am not prepared at this juncture to say absolutely that if the AUMF ar-
gument does not work here, that FISA is unconstitutional as applied.”). 
 234. See supra note 233 and accompanying text. 
 235. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
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on the notion that FISA is unconstitutional to the extent that it 
interferes with the program. 
The constitutional theory on which the administration re-
lies to make these points is the same theory that it uses to bol-
ster its reading of the AUMF. Again, the administration em-
phasizes the Framers’ creation of a President designed to act 
quickly, efficiently and secretly.236 The administration explains 
that the presidential office was designed in this way so that the 
President can protect the nation effectively, and that the Presi-
dent has inherent authority to do so through surveillance and 
other means.237 Congress is deemed to tread on dangerous con-
stitutional ground when it restricts such powers.238 
B. THE ADMINISTRATION’S MISTAKES ABOUT SECRECY AND 
SEPARATED POWERS 
The administration’s legal errors are wide-ranging. But 
one claim stands out as a linchpin to which various tenuous ar-
guments are tethered: That is, the administration’s core secrecy 
claim—the notion that national security required that the sur-
veillance program’s very existence be secret, that requesting 
congressional approval of the program would have let the pro-
verbial cat out of the bag, and that it is the President’s right 
and responsibility to keep secrets under such circumstances. 
From this follows the administration’s claim that the AUMF 
encompasses the power to engage in surveillance that deviates 
from FISA’s directives where the President deems such secret 
policy necessary. It also follows, according to the administra-
tion, that Article II empowers the President to so act and that 
this constitutional license trumps FISA’s statutory provisions. 
Indeed, we see the administration’s reliance on the secrecy 
point in the pieces of its argument cited above. Recall that the 
administration, in defending the NSA program, deemed the 
President’s commander-in-chief power at its apex in “matters 
requiring secrecy—and intelligence in particular.”239 Recall also 
the administration’s emphasis on the President’s special capac-
ity for secrecy.240 Furthermore, when testifying before Con-
gress, Attorney General Gonzales was quick to “clarify” that 
 
 236. See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 7, 25. 
 237. See id. at 9−10, 25; Gonzales Transcript, supra note 218, at 12, 21−23. 
 238. See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 3, 28−36; Gonzales Tran-
script, supra note 218, at 60. 
 239. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.  
 240. See supra note 236 and accompanying text. 
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the administration avoided seeking congressional approval be-
cause of the secrecy imperative, after he had used language 
suggesting that such approval was not sought because it would 
be politically difficult to obtain it.241 
The administration’s arguments badly misconstrue the re-
lationship between secrecy and separated powers. The remain-
der of this Subpart outlines the administration’s major mis-
steps in this regard. As noted above, the administration largely 
blends its statutory and constitutional arguments. That is, the 
administration relies on an extremely broad reading of the 
President’s Article II power to build and maintain entire pro-
grams in secret. It uses this reading both as an independent 
argument about constitutional power and to justify very broad 
interpretations of any statutory authorizations to the Presi-
dent. Given the administration’s approach, this Subpart’s re-
sponsive points for the most part do not distinguish between 
the administration’s statutory and constitutional arguments. 
Where such distinction is not made, it is because the responsive 
points at issue engage both the administration’s broad reading 
of Article II and its companion conclusion that the AUMF em-
powers the President to circumvent statutory obligations—
including FISA—that the President deems obstructive of his 
ability to use force. 
1. Conflating Macro-Secrecy and Micro-Secrecy 
The administration’s arguments conflate macro-secrecy 
and micro-secrecy. That is, it assumes, with very little explana-
tion, that the need to conduct surveillance in secret necessarily 
means that the program permitting such surveillance itself 
must be secret. Bruce Ackerman made this point shortly after 
the NSA program came to light, deeming President Bush’s 
claimed secrecy needs to be grounded in: 
a simple confusion between creating the spying program and imple-
menting it: Once the NSA begins spying on particular Americans, 
leaks about the details might well endanger national security. But 
this point is irrelevant with respect to this key question: Why didn’t 
he let us know he was creating the new spying initiative in the first 
place?242 
This problem has overlapping practical and legal elements. 
On a practical level, it is difficult to imagine why knowledge of 
the precise legal framework for conducting covert surveillance 
 
 241. See Gonzales Transcript, supra note 218, at 14. 
 242. See Ackerman, supra note 5. 
KITROSSER_4FMT 6/1/2007 11:16:58 AM 
2007] “MACRO-TRANSPARENCY” DIRECTIVE 1201 
 
would advantage terrorists who already know that they can be 
spied on covertly. To the very limited extent that the Bush ad-
ministration has deigned to engage this question, their answer 
seems to be that such knowledge reminds “the enemy” of what 
it already knows but might have forgotten. This “logic” is re-
flected in testimony by Attorney General Gonzales before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee: 
I think, based on my experience, it is true. You would assume that the 
enemy is presuming that we are engaged in some kind of surveillance. 
But if they are not reminded about it all the time in the newspapers 
and in stories, they sometimes forget, and you’re amazed at some of 
the communications that exist. And so, but when you keep sticking it  
. . . in their face that we are involved in some kind of surveillance, 
even if it is unclear in these stories, it can’t help but make a differ-
ence, I think.243 
This substantial practical problem with the administra-
tion’s secrecy argument is underscored by a deeper problem of 
constitutional law. The Constitution’s Framers were hardly 
oblivious to the risks posed by a dangerous world. As Jason 
Mazzone writes: 
  With more than two centuries of national government behind us, 
it is easy to forget that in the early years following the Revolutionary 
War, it was far from certain that the American experiment in inde-
pendence would ultimately succeed. Eighteenth-century America was 
a precarious setting. Although they had defeated the British, Ameri-
cans remained preoccupied with the notion that there were forces 
conspiring against their freedom. These fears were not the reflection 
of unfounded paranoia. As Gordon Wood notes, “The Federalists were 
. . . not mistaken in their sense of the fragility of the United States. It 
was the largest republic since ancient Rome, and as such it was con-
tinually in danger of falling apart.” 
  . . . . 
  In addition to external attacks, violence might erupt from within. 
Sleeper cells might seem a new evil, but eighteenth-century Ameri-
cans took for granted that foreign sympathizers were living among 
them, biding their time for the right moment to strike or to stir up 
trouble . . . .244 
Mindful of the many dangers posed to national security, to 
liberty and to wisdom, the Framers struck the balance embod-
ied by separation of powers generally and the macro-
transparency directive in particular. That is, the Framers de-
signed a Constitution generally requiring openness and delib-
eration in the crafting of policy. At the nation’s disposal, how-
 
 243. Gonzales Transcript, supra note 218, at 107. 
 244. Jason Mazzone, The Security Constitution, 53 UCLA L. REV. 29, 37−38 
(2005). 
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ever, would be a powerful executive capable of implementing 
such policy in secret. For the President to run a secret program 
for years and then to defend it with a barely explained assur-
ance that openness would have been too dangerous to employ, 
makes a mockery of the Framers’ design. 
2. Conflating Zone Two and Zone Three Actions 
The administration also tends to conflate Jacksonian zone 
two actions and Jacksonian zone three actions.245 The admini-
stration frequently emphasizes that it has inherent power to 
conduct surveillance absent congressional approval.246 Assum-
ing such zone two power, however, it is not at all clear that this 
would translate to zone three power should the power be used 
in the face of contrary legislation such as FISA. As noted ear-
lier, the administration deemphasizes the zone three question, 
at times stating that a zone three action likely would be consti-
tutional and at times avoiding that question entirely and focus-
ing on its zone two arguments.247 However, the administration 
cannot avoid the zone three question should they not prevail on 
the point that the AUMF overrides FISA’s requirements.248 If 
FISA’s requirements apply, then the administration’s actions 
are legal only if FISA is unconstitutional to the extent that it 
overrides the President’s power to operate the NSA program.249 
What is most important is that the administration’s con-
flating of zone two and zone three actions obscures the signifi-
cance of the distinction for separated powers generally and for 
the macro-transparency directive in particular. As noted ear-
lier, zone two actions are less presumptively legitimate than 
zone one actions because the former are not the product of the 
legislative process with its deliberation and transparency based 
protections. At the same time, there are important constitu-
tional advantages to zone two actions that give them much 
greater presumptive legitimacy than zone three actions. First, 
zone two actions simply do not stray as far as do zone three ac-
 
 245. See supra Part I.C (discussing the Jacksonian power zones). 
 246. See supra notes 230−37 and accompanying text. 
 247. See supra notes 232−33 and accompanying text. 
 248. See supra notes 234−35 and accompanying text. 
 249. See Posting of Marty Lederman to Balkanization, http://balkin 
.blogspot.com (July 23, 2006, 21:20 EST) (pointing out that it is a mistake to 
conflate inherent power with the power to act in the face of a conflicting stat-
ute, and that Senator Specter makes this mistake in emphasizing the admini-
stration’s inherent power to conduct surveillance in Arlen Specter, Op-Ed., 
Surveillance We Can Live With, WASH. POST, July 24, 2006, at A19). 
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tions from the macro-transparency directive. While zone two 
actions are not flagged publicly by legislation (or, in the case of 
the grey space between zone one and zone two,250 they are 
flagged only by an extremely broad legislative delegation under 
which countless executive decisions could fall), they also do not 
occur in the face of public, legislative reassurance that they will 
not occur. This has important implications for public knowledge 
and for the legislature’s ability to perform its oversight and leg-
islative responsibilities. A common lament about the NSA’s se-
cret post-9/11 activities, for example, is that Congress focused 
publicly on balancing civil liberties and national security 
through post-9/11 amendments to FISA, while the administra-
tion secretly and unilaterally granted itself additional exemp-
tions from FISA.251 
Second, Congress obviously knows how to refrain from 
passing legislation or to leave legislation so broad as to create a 
zone two situation or a grey space between zone two and zone 
one (in which legislation is so broad as to encompass a wide 
range of conceivable executive actions). Congress thus has the 
tools to permit precisely the degree of presidential discretion 
that the administration indicates it wished to have with respect 
to surveillance. Indeed, such discretion existed, in large part, 
prior to the Church hearings and to FISA’s creation. When 
Congress chooses to alter or eliminate such discretion, the pub-
lic, legislative process through which such alteration occurs, 
along with any dialogue or oversight that accompanied or pre-
ceded that process, substantially bolsters the legitimacy of this 
choice. Such transparency, dialogue and investigation are 
hallmarks of the legislative structure and structurally are far 
less likely to be present where the President chooses to ignore 
such legislative imperatives. 
3. Overlooking Congressional Authority to Manage 
Information Dissemination 
The Bush administration also has operated under the view 
 
 250. See supra notes 102−03 and accompanying text. 
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that it has the discretion to pick and choose which members of 
Congress, if any, shall be notified of its intelligence programs 
and that it further may prescribe the terms under which those 
members shall be briefed. The administration apparently 
waited for a substantial time period after the NSA program be-
gan to notify congresspersons of its existence.252 After that time 
period, it did not notify Congress or even the congressional in-
telligence committees as a whole, but rather notified the con-
gressional “Gang of Eight”253 comprised of “the chairmen and 
ranking minority members of the congressional intelligence 
committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House of 
Representatives, and the majority and minority leaders of the 
Senate.”254 Reports from some “Gang of Eight” members indi-
cate that they were notified only under strict non-disclosure 
conditions.255 Among other things, they were not permitted to 
consult with or to share any of the information that they 
learned with their staff or with other members of Congress.256 
The problems with the Bush administration’s approach to 
congressional disclosure are multi-fold. First, on a practical 
level, it is impossible to have effective congressional oversight 
when information is conveyed only to a handful of congressper-
sons on the condition that they not repeat it. Second, and more 
fundamentally, the executive branch once again ignored the 
fact that it is constrained by Congress’s macro-directives, in-
cluding with respect to information-sharing. Indeed, congres-
sional information-sharing directives serve constitutional 
transparency values on two levels—first, in their general le-
gitimacy as macro-transparent rules, and second, in their man-
agement of information between executive, legislature and the 
public. In this case, the administration ignored its statutory re-
sponsibility to keep the congressional intelligence committees 
 
 252. See CAP REPORT, supra note 107, at 20. 
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 254. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
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“fully and currently informed” of intelligence activities.257 
Third, the executive branch also sweeps too broadly in its uni-
lateral determination that disclosure on statutory terms—in 
this case, disclosure to the intelligence committees—would 
have been too dangerous to undertake. As noted above, the ad-
ministration’s only proffered argument for keeping the pro-
gram’s very existence secret is laughable (literally so, as the 
transcript that records the justification records simultaneous 
laughter).258 More important, it is not for the executive branch 
to make this unilateral determination in the face of a conflict-
ing statutory mandate. Rather, it is for Congress, through 
statutory terms and through its Constitutional power to make 
rules for its proceedings, to set the macro-framework under 
which information disclosure, including any negotiations be-
tween executive and legislature on that score, can take place. 
Indeed, current rules provide mechanisms by which committees 
to which classified information is disclosed can determine 
whether the public interest will be served by declassifying and 
disclosing the information.259 Such determinations also took 
place during the Church hearings.260 Openness can, of course, 
pose dangers. But so can secrecy, as our recent intelligence dis-
asters and countless other historical missteps attest.261 The 
Framers struck a balance by leaving it to Congress to establish 
macro-transparent rules, including rules as to information dis-
closure. The executive is left to implement the rules, sometimes 
in secret, and sometimes through give-and-take with Congress. 
 
 257. See supra notes 190−91 and accompanying text. The NSA program did 
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4. Abusing the Concept of “Emergency” and the Relationship 
of Such Abuse to Secrecy and Separated Powers 
The administration’s arguments also stretch the concept of 
emergency presidential power to the breaking point. The Presi-
dent’s speed and vigor is intended in part to enable him or her 
to respond to immediate emergencies. In rare cases, an emer-
gency may justify even the circumvention of statutory man-
dates. However, the concept of emergency must be rare and 
temporally limited. “Once the immediate emergency passes, the 
transparency, dialogue and other protections of the legislative 
process must be invoked to legitimize any continuing activities 
that fall outside of existing statutory mandates.”262 Otherwise, 
the concept of “emergency” action is indistinguishable from 
long-term secretive, even deceptive rule by executive fiat, justi-
fied by the bare fact that we live in a dangerous world. In con-
ducting a secret program for roughly four years before it was 
discovered through press leaks and in offering no plausible jus-
tification for such long-term secrecy, the administration en-
gaged in precisely such deceptive, unilateral rule. 
The administration also bypassed FISA’s emergency provi-
sions enabling seventy-two-hour, emergency warrantless sur-
veillance263 or warrantless surveillance for fifteen days follow-
ing a declaration of war.264 The administration has suggested 
that these exceptions were insufficient to meet its needs in the 
wake of 9/11.265 This, however, is a policy argument that the 
Constitution demands be put to the test of the macro-
transparent legislative process, even if the result of that proc-
ess is to authorize secretive implementation. 
  CONCLUSION   
The Constitution’s Framers placed much faith in the peo-
ple of this country to govern themselves. Yet they also under-
stood the vast human capacity to abuse power. Their resulting 
constitutional design provided for multiple separated and over-
lapping powers so that “ambition [might] counteract ambi-
 
 262. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 263. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 264. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. The discussion of this ex-
ception assumes, for the sake of argument, that the AUMF constitutes a dec-
laration of war. This is not an entirely uncontroversial proposition. See Bazan 
& Elsea, supra note 2, at 26−27. 
 265. See generally Gonzales Transcript, supra note 218. 
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tion,”266 with abuses in one part of government likely to be 
caught by another part or exposed by the press. As James 
Madison wrote, “[a] dependence on the people is, no doubt, the 
primary control on the government; but experience has taught 
mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions” through struc-
tural checks and balances.267 A requisite element of this protec-
tive structure is macro-transparency. Thus, while the executors 
of federal policies—namely the President and the executive 
branch—may be authorized or inherently empowered to con-
duct particular activities in secret, they remain subject to 
checking through transparent statutory directives and to con-
gressional oversight that itself is governed by macro-
transparent information control rules. This macro-
transparency directive is dynamic in effect. Congressional over-
sight, for example, may reveal one secret that can lead to the 
stripping away of additional layers of secret activity. And ille-
gal conduct may be revealed and may lead to judicial activities 
that are themselves revelatory in nature. 
The Framers’ brilliant design can go a long way toward 
saving us from ourselves. A watchful press, for example, might 
shame a sleeping Congress into assessing executive corruption, 
which might in turn activate judicial processes and corrective, 
macro-transparent legislative measures. To some extent this is 
the story, as of late September 2006, of the post-9/11 NSA sur-
veillance controversy. While a fearful public, press and Con-
gress remained largely idle in the years after 9/11, The New 
York Times finally revealed the NSA program’s existence after 
sitting on the story for over a year. And this sparked some 
measure of public and congressional outrage in the months that 
followed, with some congressional hearings held, some legisla-
tive proposals offered and some judicial relief sought. 
But the story of the recent NSA surveillance controversy is 
also a story about our system’s ultimate reliance on the people. 
When all is said and done, the people simply must care enough 
about statutory and constitutional evasions for exposure to fuel 
and sustain government’s checking mechanisms. It remains to 
be seen whether the people and their representatives will rise 
to this challenge with respect to the surveillance controversy. 
While some congressional hearings indeed have been held, oth-
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ers have been avoided or substantially curtailed.268 And in the 
hearings that have been held, witnesses’ claims to be not at lib-
erty to answer particular inquiries often have prevailed with-
out question.269 Furthermore, while responsive legislation has 
not been passed as of mid-November 2006, there remains a 
chance at this point that legislation largely authorizing the 
program will pass the lame-duck, Republican-dominated Con-
gress.270 
Our constitutional system’s ultimate dependence on the 
people is well reflected in Learned Hand’s famous admonition 
that “Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women. When it dies 
there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it.”271 But 
there is another way that liberty can die. Liberty can die when 
systemic mechanisms meant to protect it break down beyond 
repair. The latter death has been threatened, since 9/11, by the 
NSA program and by similar acts of executive aggrandizement. 
It says much about our system’s structural strength that 
transparency eventually prevailed and that public, legislative 
and judicial reactions followed. Whether those reactions sus-
tain themselves, and what form they take over time, will tell us 
much about whether liberty prevails in our hearts. 
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